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Abstract 
The wormhole attack is one of the most popular and serious attacks in Wireless sensor networks and most 
proposed protocols to defend against this attack use extra hardware which impacts highly on the cost of 
implementation as well causing extra overheads which have high implications on the sensors power 
consumption. Due to the limited resources in the sensor nodes, protocols developed for wireless sensor 
networks should not impact heavily on the computational overheads and power consumption in order to 
extend the network lifetime.  In this paper, we exploit the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) Viterbi 
algorithm, to detect the wormhole attack based on the maximum probabilities computed for a hidden state 
transition. We use different shortest paths hop count costs between a source and a destination node as the 
states input to the Viterbi algorithm, earmarking the least cost paths as the suspect wormhole paths, for a 
given observation sequence of the given shortest paths.  
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1. Introduction 
A wireless sensor network(WSN) consists of a collection of wireless sensor nodes which exchange data 
among themselves without the reliance on a wired backbone network [1]. Sensor nodes are typically 
distinguished by their limited power, processing and memory resources. Their applications allow users to 
monitor, track, and observe a variety of objects and phenomena in different environments [1] . The WSNs 
can also be classified into five main categories: Terrestrial WSN, Mobile WSN, Underground WSN, 
Underwater WSN, and Multimedia WSN [1].  
Sensing of coastal management and surveillance tasks, or ocean monitoring for disaster prevention and 
recovery applications can be supported by deployment of underwater sensor networks. Sink nodes are 
normally placed on the sea surface established as buoy to relay the information to the onshore station via 
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satellite or long-range radio frequencies. The aquatic environments however have a major difference from 
its terrestrial counterparts in the shift from radio frequency to acoustics, that changes the speed of 
communication from that of light to that of sound [2] . 
Information routing in these networks faces a number of security threats. One such threat is the wormhole 
attack [3] . Since the sensors use a shared acoustic channel to send information in underwater 
environments, the malicious nodes can eavesdrop on the packets, by capturing packets from one location 
  0&'   1 &% "&% &! & other malicious node, which is assumed to be located at some 
%& %! !'% !%& *"&&!$"+&0&'  1"&%!ly. This attack 
takes place using either in-band (tunneling) or out-of-band communication to transfer the packets between 
these locations. This can give nodes that are in the neighborhood of the attackers the impression that links 
exist between them and other nodes that are in reality far outside of transmission range, severely 
disrupting communication and/or the localization process. Moreover it is possible even if the attacker has 
not compromised any hosts and even if all communication provide authenticity and confidentiality. An 
example of a wormhole attack is illustrated in the figure below: 
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F igure1: Wormhole link between a pair of nodes u and v fabricates a fake connection between them. 
 
This paper focuses on a detection approach based on the computationally efficient Viterbi algorithm that 
enables us to utilize the shortest paths hop count costs between a source node and destination node in the 
network as states, to compute the hidden state sequences using the maximum state transition probabilities, 
for a given observation sequence of the shortest paths. This paper is organized as follows: in section two 
we discuss the related works that have been done, in section three we present our system model, in section 
four we discuss the simulation results then finally in section five we conclude our work. 
1.1. Related Work.  
Bhargava et al [8], proposes a detection approach based on localization of nodes using the Multi 
Dimensional Scaling (MDS) technique of localization, enabling comparison to be made on the structure 
of the network with and without the attack. By detecting the anomalies introduced by the fake 
connections, the attack is detected. It however, like many MDS techniques has a problem of scalability 
since it relies on a central processing node for all the computations. Wang et al Presents a similar 
approach in [9] but takes into account the existence of more than one wormhole threat and is also robust 
against distance estimation errors. [10] on the other hand concentrates on the underwater scenario. He 
uses ToA based technique to measure the distances between the sensor nodes, which requires hardware 
components for timing, hence is undesirable since it has a high implication on cost. MDS on the other 
hand concentrates more on the general layout of the network and not the nodes position accuracy. Marco 
Pugliese 2008 [6]  used a non parametric version of HMM, the Weak Process Model (WPM), wherein 
state transition probabilities are reduced to rules of reach ability to detect anomalies in a network, where 
he detected the wormhole attack based on identified observable events correlated to a threat by applying a 
set of anomaly rules to the incoming traffic. Alarms were then issued as soon as one or more high 
potential attacks were detected. Guofei Jiang [7] analyzed the properties of such weak process models and 
proposed a recursive algorithm to compute the hypotheses of the hidden state sequence and the size of the 
hypothesis set, for a robust process detection. These works did not take into account the exact probability 
values for the state transitions and observational probabilities since they set for such probabilities, binary 
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(0,1) values depending on whether the values were close to 1 or 0, which could compromise on the 
detection accuracy. Our approach uses exact probability values and RSS for distance measurement which 
does not require any extra hardware, and proceeds to exploit the Viterbi algorithm to compute maximum 
hidden state transition probabilities for its detection, given a HMM model. 
1.2. System Model 
A. Distance measurement derivation 
To calculate the distance we need to know the values of the RSSIs from the beacon nodes to the sensor 
node. This value can be obtained by taking into account the absorption attenuation of the signals from the 
!  !&!&% %!$ ! !&%5!$"![11] %'%&!'&&('!5( 
the frequency, as follows: 
              
                                                                   (1) 
Firstly, we considered the spherical spread loss[12] since it provides a reasonable fit to the measured data 
under a wide variety of conditions. Consequently, the RSS can be calculated based on the following 
equation. 
%$10-3                                                                                                                   (2)              
 
Where TLsph :denotes the spherical spread loss and equals 20log10(R), 
R :denotes the distance the acoustic wave has travelled,  
 :denotes the thorp attenuation model [4]. 
The next step is to solve Equation (2) based on Dist variable. Lambert W function is manipulated for 
extracting the inverse of Equation (2), as it is an exponential function [4], to derive the final distance 
equation, 
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since ln(10)= 2.30258509 and %1.1498, 
 
Dist=7554.26129654×W(1.32327×10-4×e0.115129255×RSS )                             (4) 
 
Hosseini et al, [4] proved that the underwater RSS based distance measurement can be an application of 
the Lambert W function. Equation (4) represents the final equation of Distance based on RSS via Lambert 
W function, according to Hosseini et al [4] , who also carried out a Lambert W function proof to prove the 
accuracy of the computed distances. 
 
C . Shortest Paths Computation 
 
Given a localized network [13-15], the distance measurements between the network nodes and the 
maximum transmission range r, the neighboring nodes are connected through arcs.  
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Let (N,A) be a network with N nodes and m arcs, where any (i, j)  A is assigned with the value c i j  R, 
that denotes the cost, or distance of  (i, j).  
A path p from i  N to j  N in (N,A) is a sequence of the form p = ( i = v1, v2, . . . , j = v6(p)),        
where (vk, vk+1)  A, for any k  ,6"4- 
$6" % &  &!" && % &% '$! !%)     $ &  &  
terminal nodes of path p, respectively. The total cost, or distance, of p is defined by:  
 
  Pvu vuCpC , ),()(                                                                                                                           (5)          
 
Given x and y two nodes of p, subp(x, y) represents its subpath from x to y. A path is said to be loop less 
when it has no repeated nodes. The set of loop less paths from i to j in (N,A) will be denoted by Pi,j, and 
given an initial, s, and a terminal, t, nodes (s not equal t), then P  will be used for Ps,t . The concatenation 
of p  Pi,j , q  P6, denoted by p  #%&"&$!&!6!$+"&"!!)+# 
Given K  N, in the K shortest loop less paths problem is intended to compute loop less paths  p1, . . . , pK 
from s to t in (N,A), by non-decreasing order of the cost such that;  
c(p1.."k) and  
c(pk."!$ +" 4,"1, . . . , pK}. 
Assuming the k shortest loop less path has the form; 
 pk = (v1 = s, . . . , v'(pk) = t), for k = 1, . . . ,K .  
 2%"$!"!% [10] to obtain new candidates is to partition the set of loop less paths in the following 
way: 
 
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                         (6) 
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where P
j
(vi) denotes the set of the loop less paths, different from p1, . . . , pj, that have subpj (s, vi) as the 
initial sub path, common with path pj !$%!. "k is picked up in X the set Pj(vd(pk)) 
where pk was determined is considered, which means that it is partitioned by computing the shortest loop 
less path in each of the subsets. Yen noted that the best deviation from pk at node vi is subpk (s, vi)  qi, 
where qi is the shortest path from vi to t, when the nodes v1, . . . , vi41 and the arcs (vi, x)  {p1, . . . , pk} 
are removed from the network. The loop less path pk is called the father of the new candidates determined 
(known as pk deviations) and vd(pk) the deviation node of pk. Thus, analyzing a given pk consists of 
modifying (N,A), by deleting some arcs and some nodes, and solving a shortest path problem between a 
pair of nodes. 
 
D . Normal behavior modeling 
 
In this paper, we use HMM to model the wormhole attack detection approach.  
HMM was applied to model the sequence of shortest paths decisions made by a source node to 
communicate to a destination node, because it is very useful for modeling the sequence information [16]. 
 An HMM ) is described as )=(A,B,(). An HMM is characterized by a set of states S, a set of possible 
observation symbols V, a number of observation symbols M, state transition probability distribution A, 
observation symbol probability B and initial state distribution ( [16]. The set of all shortest paths hop 
count costs corresponds to the set of states, while the set of all the shortest paths corresponds to that of 
possible symbol observations V, and a number of the shortest paths decisions taken by the source node 
correspond to M, for a length of an observation sequence time T.  

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This phase is to model the normal behavior, which determines HMM parameters for the computation of 
the maximum state transition probabilities via the Viterbi algorithm. 
 
E . Viterbi algorithm for wormhole attack detection 
 
We applied the Viterbi algorithm to find optimal state sequence, given the sequence of observation 
symbols M, for a given sequence time, T. The computed state sequence is based on the maximum 
probabilities computed at each sequence step to determine which state is encountered at that given step. 
In our detection approach, since the set of states corresponds to the shortest paths hop count costs, and we 
know that the wormhole attack advertises the best path with the least cost, we ear marked all the least cost 
states in the computed state sequence to be the suspect costs advertised by the wormhole path, and 
compared their maximum transition probabilities at each of the respective sequence steps of occurrence, 
with highest probability value depicting the highest likeliness that the particular cost was being advertised 
by a wormhole path. 
The procedures of the Viterbi algorithm are as follows: 
Initialization: 
&1(i)= ( ibi(O1!!S  
%1(i)=0           
  
&1(i) is the probability that symbol O1 occurs at time t=1 at state i. The variable %1(i) stores the optimal 
costs states.  
Recursion: 
&t &t-1(i)aij]bj(O t),   !!	!!!! 
%t &t-1(i)aij] ,        !!  	!!!!S     
&t(j) denotes the weight accumulated when we are in state j at time t as the algorithm proceeds. The 
argmax operator selects the index j which maximizes the bracketed expression, to obtain the sequences of 
the hidden states. 
 Termination: 
 &T(i)]                                                           !!     
q*T &T(i)]                                                     !!   
1.3.  Simulation tests and results 
It is necessary for each new designed or developed algorithm, mechanism, or protocol, to be evaluated 
and tested to demonstrate its integrity. Therefore, a simulation scenario has been established for validating 
the developed detection approach.  
 
A. Shortest paths simulation 
 
Using the accurate distance measurements [4], the maximum transmission distances, r=40m, and a 
localized 400m by 400m network, we simulated four shortest paths between a single source node and 
destination node, using MATLAB. In addition, the simulation results of the distance measurements 
results[4] showed steady values with minimal errors as shown in the sample table below: 
 
 
Actual distances Lambert 
distances 
         E r ror 
296.4675 296.3628 0.1047 
213.0376 212.9615 0.0761 
395.2025 395.0646 0.1379 
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Table 1: Table comparing the actual distances and Lambert computed distances 
The results of the shortest paths, marked by the red paths in the localized network between a single source 
node 37 and destination node 10 is shown in the graph in the next page, with the 4 shortest paths having 
hop count costs according to the paths taken, as also shown below: 
Cost 1= 5 hop counts (37-2-21-27-7-10) 
Cost 2= 5 hop counts (37-21-27-1-7-10) 
Cost 3= 4 hop counts (37- 21- 27- 7-10) 
Cost 4= 5 hop counts (37-21-27-1-12-10) 
 
F igure 2: The network graph depicting the localized network with a 40m neighbour relationship on a 400m by 400 m 
field. 
 
B. HMM Viterbi Wormhole detection approach 
 
After successfully simulating the shortest paths problem, we ran a random observation sequence steps, O 
for time T =10, where each entity in the observation sequence array depicts the random path decision 
made at that particular time step. 
O = [3 1 4 1 2 2 2 1 4 3] 
 
For example in our array, at time t=1 the random path decision made was a path number 3 meaning the 
hidden state computed for this sequence step is the cost of this random path 3. If another sequence step 
has the same random path decision, in our case t=1 and t=3, the computed hidden state would normally be 
different from any other same random path decision. This means that for each step an independent 
random decision is made for what the computed hidden state will belong to the random path decision at 
time t. so it would occur that the same path decisions in the array would not have the same value of path 
costs. With the set of states, S=  {cost 1,cost 2, cost 3, cost 4} and the set of observations, V={path 1, path 
2, path 3, path 4}, to simulate the hidden state sequences, and their respective maximum probabilities at 
each sequence time step, t, given the HMM model )=(A,B,(), Where A is the S  S state transition matrix,  
B is the V  S observation matrix and  ( is a uniform initial S state distribution probability.  
Since the wormhole path advertises the best path with the least cost, we set all the path costs greater than 
the minimum costs in the computed hidden state sequence to a probability of zero(0), depicting zero 
possibility of the path being a wormhole path. Since the wormhole attack advertises the least costs paths 
in a network, we considered the maximum probabilities for all the least costs states in the computed state 
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sequence. Our simulation results showed the computed probabilities and plotted them against the 
sequence time steps, t.  
A threshold probability of 0.5 was set for the detection process. If at a time sequence step the probability 
of the hidden least cost state is higher than the threshold, an alarm is raised at this particular sequence 
step, to depict the existence of the wormhole attack. Necessary measures can then be taken to avoid this 
route, at such a particular time sequence that an alarm is raised. Our simulation generated the computed 
hidden states, & as shown below, for a random observational sequence steps for a total of time, T=10. 
Recall that cost 1=5 hops, cost 2=5 hops, cost 3=4 hops and cost 4=5 hops. 
Hidden states,  = {cost 3, cost 3, cost 4, cost 1, cost 4, cost 2, cost 1, cost 1, cost 4, cost 2} . 
 
The graph shows the detection results, for a random observational sequence steps for a total of time, 
T=10.  
 
F igure 3: Graph depicting the probability level of an attack occurring at each observational step. 
 
From the graph, at the observation sequence step t=1, a random path decision of path 3 was made and for 
this path, the hidden state is cost=4 hops, which is the least cost meaning the path decision could be a 
wormhole path. Same applies to step t=2 since the hidden state for the random path 1 decision is also a 
cost of 4 hops.  
Since we plotted maximum transition probabilities of the hidden least costs states at each step t as they 
depict the wormhole attack, we tested the likelihood of the path decisions at t=1 and t=2 being a 
wormhole path. 
Since at t=1 the probability is greater than the threshold 0.5., the path 3 decision was a wormhole path and 
an alarm generation was made to stop communication. 
At step t=2 the probability is less than the threshold hence depicts a safe route. No alarm generation was 
necessary and the path 1 decision was a safe path.  
The rest of the sequence steps show zero probability of the path decisions being a wormhole path since the 
computed hidden states were not the least path cost, that is were greater than 4 hops. 
1.4. Conclusion  
In this paper we successfully exploited the Viterbi algorithm approach and Lambert W function, as shown 
in the simulation results, for the detection of the wormhole attack and accurate inter node distance 
computation. Our approach was attractive as the recursive nature of the Viterbi algorithm would limit 
computational overheads and hence reduce power consumption of the resource constrained sensors nodes. 
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